I argue that if the notion of coercion is given a non-normative interpretation, then it can do no work for us. Of its normative interpretations – any precisification of the term and condemnation of coercion arising from natural law is ineliminably question-begging; and neither will any positivist precisification deliver the objectionability of coercion. So what and all that remains for coercion to be is a con word, useful, apparently, to rhetoricians, but of no use whatever to political philosophers.

Categories: Papers My Wife Said I Should Have Published Long Ago, Social and Political Philosophy

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: