Modal Immortality

Abstract

In this paper I articulate four members of a house of conceptual assembly which seem severally electable but turn out to be incompatible when admitted to cabinet. These are 1) modal realism, 2) co-reductionism about personal identity and what matters in survival, 3) dropping the causal connexity requirement for personal continuance, and 4) the belief that we are mortal. Having demonstrated their incompatibility, I then urge that we accept, with regret, the resignation of modal realism.

ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE MAXIMIZING/SATISFICING DEBATE

Simultaneous Attackers in Artificial Prudence

In this paper I motivate and then sketch a modelling program within virtual ethics I call Artificial Prudence, so named after Peter Danielson’s Artificial Morality, upon which it purports to be an improvement. But there is a glitch – or at least a limitation – within Artificial Prudence that cannot be discharged. Here I explicate that glitch/limitation and investigate just how much damage, if any, it does to the program.