Two goldfish swimming in a fish bowl. One says to the other, “Do you think it’s possible that there’s someone dropping that food for us, aerating the water, turning the light and off, and so on?”

“Well,” answers the other goldfish, “I suppose it’s possible, but we could never know one way or the other. And besides, what difference would it make? So c’mon, let’s go see what’s behind that rock.”

So, could it be true there’s a God Who’s done all the things the theist thinks He’s done for us? Yes. Even if it could be proven that there is, would it make a particle of difference to what we should do today? No. So the essence of my atheism is not that I think the God-hypothesis is either unverifiable or incoherent or both. It’s that it’s irrelevant. Nothing whatsoever hangs on it. And because nothing hangs on it, the theist has to add something to make it matter. She has to add that there’s something this God wants from us, and that it’s incumbent upon us, either from fear or gratitude, to try to satisfy that want. But unlike the God-hypothesis on its own, these additions are both undiscoverable and incoherent.

Not so, claims the theist. God has revealed His will to us in Scripture, if we’d but consult it. And we’re to be instruments of His will because He’s instructed us to. That He’s revealed His will to us in Scripture is kiboshed by the Euthphyro Problem. And that we should do as we’re told just begs the question. So no, add whatever you like, belief that there’s a God, whether true or false, doesn’t do any work. It may be of passing metaphysical interest, but it’s normatively inert.

Categories: Philosophy of Religion

Tags: atheism, Euthyphro, theism