Abstract
In this paper I consider all 243 positions that could constitute libertarianism and show that all but a few are false and the few remaining are banal. I argue further that all 243 versions must issue a promissory note for (what I call) the Reducibility of Interference Thesis and to (what I call) the Reducibility of Ownership Thesis, on neither of which can the libertarian make good.
Viminitz, Paul. “A Proof that Libertarianism is Either False or Banal.” Liberalism. Springer, Dordrecht, 2000. 211-219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023%2FA%3A1004782408394
Categories: Published Papers, Social and Political Philosophy
Paulosophical Vimplications 
Why do you think that you can logically categorize a moral recommendation as false, in the case of libertarianism?
Hume’s old is-ought fallacy is actually a fallacy because “ought to do” prescriptions or “ought not do” proscriptions are different verbs from the “is” and “is not” distinctions upon which truth and falsehood are predicated. Turn about is fair play.
So just as one cannot justify moral conclusions [“ought to do” vs. “ought not do”] from factual assertions or denials, then one can hardly justify “is” conclusions [Libertarianism IS a moral/political doctrine which IS false.] concerning an OUGHT TO doctrine [As in maximizing liberty ought to maximize good outcomes.]
Kevin [I always metaphorically “sign” my name. Why then am I anonymous? I am not the sharpest tool in the shed re. Social Media.]
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