

# **A PROOF THAT EGALITARIANISM IS EITHER FALSE OR BANAL**

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## **Abstract**

In this paper I argue that the only equality that need be postulated between agents qua heading *into* a theory of normative ethics and/or politics is that the agents in question be equally involved in interactivity in which there's a cooperative dividend to which they can have access if and only if they can bring themselves to (in some sense) cooperate. The kinds of equality to which they're *end-of-pipe* entitled, however, is determined by whether or not an egalitarian distribution of the dividend-type in question between the persons in question can or cannot be expected to maximize the utility of the institutor-pair in question. The upshot of this view, then, is that, our intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding, the notion of equality can play no interesting role in either ethical or political thought.

# A PROOF THAT EGALITARIANISM IS EITHER FALSE OR BANAL

## I. CONTRACTARIANISM PROPERLY-SO-CALLED

First, *two* points of clarification:

That Christianity could, at least arguably, be more accurately described as [Saul of] Tarsus-ism, or something of the sort, is cause, but not cause enough, to rename millions of churches and reprint millions of letterheads. And so the fact that *contractarianism* is an even more egregious misnomer is insufficient grounds to seek, and then insist on, a better term. Still, it's important not to be - because it's so commonplace to be - misled by the 'contract' metaphor. In fact I'd go further. If one *does* take the contract metaphor seriously, perhaps he ought not to call himself a contractarian.

What *should* he call himself, then? Well, Glaucon's word for him is 'mad'. "They say," he reports to Socrates,

that to do wrong is naturally good, to be wronged is bad, but the suffering of injury so far exceeds in badness the good of inflicting it that when men have done wrong to each other and suffered it, and have had a taste of both, those who are *unable* [my emphasis] to avoid the latter and practise the former decide that it is profitable to come to an *agreement* [my emphasis] with each other neither to inflict injury nor to suffer it. As a result they begin to make laws and covenants, and the law's command they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice; it stands between the best and the worst, the best being to do wrong without paying the penalty and the worst to be wronged without the power of revenge. The just then is a mean between two extremes ... [But, he adds,] ... it is welcomed and honoured *because of men's lack of power to do wrong* [my emphasis]. The man who has that power ... [e.g. the shepherd of Gyges] ... would not make a compact with anyone not to inflict injury or suffer it. [Or if he did, he would hardly follow through on that compact. For f]or him that would be **mad**. (*Republic*, 358e)

So why is the 'contractarian' who takes the contract metaphor seriously as 'mad' as "the man who, ha[ving] the power to both inflict injury and avoid the suffering of it", nonetheless honours his compact to do neither? Because by madness is meant nothing more than irrationality. And because in the absence of some solution to (what we now call) this 'compliance problem', it's irrational not to 'inflict injury' when one could fare better by doing so.

One such madman, then, must be John Rawls. For in his *A Theory of Justice* he tells us that the *just* distribution of the liberal and material dividends of civil society is:

**whatever rational agents, concerned to maximize on the satisfaction of their considered and well-ordered preferences, but faced with patterns of dilemmatic interactivity (like Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken), would agree to - hence his putative 'contractarianism' - behind a veil of ignorance as to their natural and social endowments.**

But as to *why* any rational agent concerned to maximize on the satisfaction of his considered and well-ordered preferences *would place himself behind that veil in the first place*, or as to why he'd follow *through* on that agreement once that veil is lifted, Rawls has no answer.<sup>1</sup>

Of course we *could* allow that justice is, albeit uninterestingly, as Rawls describes it. But then all the interesting work in ethics and normative politics would remain to be done under the rubric of "Why be just?" Contractarians *properly*-so-called, by contrast, are concerned to do something *interesting*. They'd *prefer* to do it under the rubric of 'justice'. But if Rawls won't forfeit his ownership of the term, 'fustice' will do as nicely. So by 'contractarianism properly-so-called' - henceforth merely 'contractarianism' - I shall mean the inquiry into:

**what rational agents, concerned to maximize on the satisfaction of their considered and well-ordered preferences, but faced with patterns of dilemmatic interactivity, like Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, would *do* to maximize on the satisfaction of those preferences.**

And what they'd *do* is cooperate to *put in place*, at the lowest available cost to themselves, institutions designed to ensure *compliance* with the terms of what *only in a very metaphorical way* may be conceived of as a contract. Contractarians can allow that such agents may make contracts. And/or they might concede that a not unreasonable metaphor for what will *eventuate from* whatever they do to maximize on the satisfaction of their preferences in such dilemmatic situations might be 'the fulfilment of a contract'. But because of the aforementioned compliance problem, I'd urge that we just drop the contract metaphor altogether and confine ourselves to the *name* contractarianism. And at that only out of deference to our terminological heritage.

## II. EQUALITY PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD

That said, the second term demanding clarification is, of course, *equality*. To say that X and Y are equal is invariably a shorthand - and as such an all too often confusing - way of saying only that they're equal in some specified respect, i.e. that they share a designated subset of properties. Of course in the limiting case, i.e. where they share *all* their properties, they're said to have satisfied that special case of equality called 'identity'. But even "2+2 equals 4" says only that the *quantitative* value to which the two expressions refer are the same.

This, I take it, will not be disputed. Nor will it be disputed - at least by contractarians - that in whatever way X and Y can be said to be equal heading *into* a moral and/or political theory (properly-so-called), it had better *not* be a *normative* way. That is, it must be that X and Y *are* in that respect equal,

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<sup>1</sup> In fact Rawls simply includes among what he calls the 'circumstances of justice' that his agents are already committed to following through on whatever commitments they've made behind the veil once that veil is lifted. To which contractarians *properly* so-called accuse Rawls of thereby *presupposing* what a theory of justice should be expected to *show*!

not that, for whatever reason, they *ought* to be. Otherwise the theory fails to make good on its promise of full reduction. That is, moral and/or political theorizing is assigned the task of *generating* normative recommendations, not *presupposing* them!

Furthermore, suppose - as happens to be the case - that the set of cordates is co-extensive with the set of renates. (For all I know about anatomy, this may even be so *necessarily*.) From which it follows that if all renates are diaperable, so are all cordates. But it doesn't follow that cordates are diaperable *because* they're cordates. Similarly, then, it might turn out that X and Y are equal in virtue of belonging to *one* of two sets to which they both belong - perhaps even *necessarily* - but *not* in virtue of belonging to the other. For example, suppose (albeit implausibly) that all and only human beings have a soul, and that all and only human beings have 46 chromosomal half-pairs. (We can even suppose, if we like, that this co-extensivity is *necessary*.) Then all and only human beings are equal with respect to the having of a soul and the having 46 chromosomal half-pairs. But - at least for those who think there's something morally special about human beings - that something isn't their having 46 chromosomal half-pairs. It's - or so at least some of them believe - their having a soul. So, for them at least, that all and only human beings have 46 chromosomal half-pairs may be interesting, but irrelevant to the analysis of morality. For the purposes of analysing morality, all that's important is that they have a soul.

Now then, *some* people think that what it is in virtue of which people are equal heading into a moral and/or political theory is that they're equally creatures especially beloved of God. I have no idea whether or not this is so. But even *if* it's so, what I don't understand is how equality in *this* respect can in any wise impact upon normative ethics and/or politics. That is, from the fact - even if it is a fact - that you and I are of equal value to our Creator, it doesn't follow that I do, or even should, value you as highly as I do, or should, value myself. Nor, vice versa. The missing and *false* principle of inference in this 'We're All God's Creatures' enthymeme is that the "X values Y" relation is both symmetrical and transitive. That is, from

**1) God values X and**

**2) God values Y**, it follows - but only by this false Principle of Symmetry performed on (1) - that **3) X values God**.

It then follows - but only by this false Principle of Transitivity performed on (2) and (3) - that

**4) X values Y**.

A similar claim - vulnerable to a like objection - is made by Mill with respect to happiness. It may be true that

**5) each person values his own happiness**.

So in that respect, let's grant, we're all equal. But, *pace* Mill, it hardly follows from (5) that

**6) the aggregate values the happiness of the aggregate**. Much less that

**7) each values the happiness of each**.

So, more generally, from the *mere* fact, even if it is a fact, that X and Y are equally capable of pleasure or pain or happiness or suffering or of what-have-you, nothing of moral and/or political import can possibly follow. We need something more. But what?

Some people think that the subset of properties relevant to normative ethics and/or politics are those constitutive of moral agency, moral patiency, either, or both. Of course since the set of human beings and the set of moral and/or political agents and/or patients are *not* co-extensive, these people do *not* believe that all humans beings are equal in the sense in question, nor do they believe that *only* human beings are equal in this respect. Thus various *proto*-contractarians have opined that one can't enter into a moral and/or political relation with animals, children, and (some include) women, because neither animals nor children (nor women?) are capable of moral and/or political agency and/or patiency.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, some have thought, one *can* enter into moral and political relations with non-human beings like God and angels.<sup>3</sup>

More contemporary thinkers are of a mind that our progenitors were just wrong about women, only sometimes right about children, overly categorical about animals, and probably mistaken about God and angels (because, in all likelihood, neither exist). But these are mere details. The real question is whether bare *agency and/or patiency* could be a property the sharing of which could give rise to a kind of equality that could be of any interest to normative ethics and/or normative politics. And the answer seems to be - no.

Jones on Earth and Twin-Jones on Twin-Earth might both enjoy full agency and/or patiency. But this equality could play no role whatever in the moral and/or normative politics of either planet. For X and Y to share a property-set that's morally and/or politically relevant, that set must include the property of occupying a common space-time continuum. And even that might be insufficient. Perhaps, unbeknownst to us, there are Marlocks living in caves below our feet. In whatever sense they and we are equals, it's not a sense relevant to our moral and political behaviour. Surely to be expected to consider Y, X must have epistemic access to Y's existence. And even *this* might be insufficient. Suppose we know, from satellite surveillance, say, that there's a well-peopled island in the South Pacific but one which, for some reason, is as utterly inaccessible to us as we are to it. Thus the question is not, With respect to which properties are these islanders our equals? but rather, In which respects *relevant to normative ethics and politics* are they so? And the answer to *that* question seems to be - none!

Contractarians properly-so-called hold that moral and/or political relations hold between, and only between, agents involved in interactivity in which there's a cooperative dividend to which they can have access if and only if they can bring themselves to (in some sense) cooperate. Why do we insist on such a sparse view of morality and politics? Because any other view leaves unanswered the questions, Why be moral? and Why be just? Accordingly, the sole condition of equality that must obtain between them is that each has the capacity to offer or withhold that cooperative behaviour. For the contractarian, then, moral and/or political relations are dyadic. That dyadic relation is symmetric but not transitive. You and I might stand in moral/political relations to each other, as might Ethiopians to each other. But you and an Ethiopian

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<sup>2</sup> E.g. in varying measures, Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant.

<sup>3</sup> Though of course Hobbes argued otherwise.

might *not* stand in such a relation. I might stand in such a relation to an Ethiopian and to you. But you and that Ethiopian might not stand in such a relation.

To repeat, for the purposes of morality and/or politics, this is the *only* species of equality that must obtain. We have no interest in whether we're all equally beloved of our Creator, or of equal intrinsic value - whatever that could mean - or of equal rationality, or equally concerned to maximize on the satisfaction of our considered and well-ordered preferences, or in any wise *else* equal. Note and nota bene: It's not that we *deny* these equality claims. Rather it's that, qua moral and political theorists at least, we're utterly *indifferent* to them!

### III. EGALITARIANISM FORMALIZED

But - and this is the operative 'but' - we're *not* indifferent as to whether - and if so under what conditions - the distribution of the liberal and material dividends of civil society that will *eventuate* from what we do to maximize on the satisfaction of our preferences will approximate equality. Indeed, that's what any debate about equality - at least any debate worth having about it - is all about. So, in order to evaluate, and evaluate commensurably, the set of all possible positions on *that* issue, I propose to render that set into common canonical schemata. To wit:

A contractarian is an *egalitarian* if and only if he subscribes to any one of the following 729 positions<sup>4</sup>:

$\forall w$ , i.e. in every possible world which is both

a) anthropic, and

b) such that there are cooperative dividends available from mutual cooperation that are denied to mutual defection, or

$\exists w$ , i.e. in at least one such world, or

$\Delta w$ , i.e. in the actual world, which is, as it happens, both (a) and (b),

$\forall c$ , i.e. under every circumstance in which one might find herself in  $w$ , i.e. in those worlds or in that world, or

$\exists c$ , i.e. under at least one such circumstance, or

$\Delta c$ , i.e. under a specific such circumstance,

$\forall p_1 p_2$ , i.e. every pair of persons each of whom are both

c) concerned to maximize their expected utilities and

d) competent to see how best to do this, or

$\exists p_1 p_2$ , i.e. at least one pair of such persons, or

$\Delta p_1 p_2$ , i.e. a specific pair of such persons, will cooperate to put in place, at the lowest available cost to themselves, institutions designed to ensure that

$\forall a$ , i.e. every person, or

$\exists a$ , i.e. at least one person, or

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<sup>4</sup> 729, because there are, as we're about to see, three possible quantifications over each of 1) worlds, 2) circumstances, 3) institutor-pairs, 4) dividend-kinds, and 5) relata  $a$  and 6)  $b$ .

**Aa**, i.e. a specific person, will enjoy an equal share of  
 $\forall d$ , i.e. each and every kind of dividend of civil society, or  
 $\exists d$ , i.e. at least one kind of such dividend, or  
**Ad**, i.e. a specific such dividend, as  
 $\forall b$ , i.e. every other person, or  
 $\exists b$ , i.e. at least one other person, or  
**Ab**, i.e. a specific person.

To avoid the claims in which they are embedded being rendered trivially true, all universal quantifiers are to be understood as scoping over non-empty sets, and  $\neg(a=b)$ .

The essence of contractarian egalitarianism, then, is the claim that persons **p1** and **p2**, who are concerned and competent to maximize their expected utilities, will cooperate to institute and maintain arrangements that will ensure that **a** will receive a share of cooperative dividend-kind **d** equal to that enjoyed by **b**.

#### IV. THIS FORMALIZATION CLARIFIED

Now let me clarify this formalization:

First, conditions **(a)**, **(b)**, **(c)**, and **(d)** are designed to capture (what have now come to be known as) the standard 'circumstances of justice'.

Second, the notion of an institutor-pair, i.e. "**p1p2**", is meant to capture that we're talking about pre-commitment strategies here, i.e. *instituting*, not complying. Presumably, then, it could remain irrational to comply but for this pre-commitment strategy, i.e. these institutions.

Third, **p1** and **p2** may or may not be the same persons as **a** and **b**. That is, it might be in our common interest to treat our two children equally, without it being in our common interest to treat each other equally.

Fourth, by using words like 'design' and 'ensure', I intend that the equality in question be the intended consequence, not just a foreseeable one. That is, one might *predict* that a certain equality, suitably scoped, would *eventuate* from some arrangement which is indifferent to equality. But that prediction would not make her an egalitarian.

This is important. A non-egalitarian entitlement theorist might defend her view against the egalitarian (more properly-so-called) by claiming that her non-egalitarian recommendations will eventuate in a distribution which is in fact more egalitarian than that which would eventuate from the entitlement theory advanced by the egalitarian (more properly-so-called). In fact this is a common theme in the debate between libertarians and socialists. For our purposes, the dispute here is not which arrangement produces the goods, but rather which distributes them equally. So, for example, Jan Narveson argues that were we *really* concerned about employment equity we'd rescind our minimum wage laws, since in their absence bigotry could no longer pay.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See his "Do We Have a Right to Non-Discrimination?", *Business Ethics in Canada*, Poff and Waluchow (eds.), Prentice Hall, 1999

But one can, and should, I think, distinguish between (what we might call) *instrumental* non-egalitarians - who urge non-egalitarian institutions as a means of achieving egalitarian results (e.g., in some measure at least, Adam Smith and J.S. Mill) - and *intrinsic* non-egalitarians, like Robert Nozick. Likewise, someone who, like Locke, thinks we should all get the same at the outset of the arrangement, but is indifferent as to what might eventuate in subsequent moments, would not be an egalitarian. In sum, what defines an egalitarian, at least for *my* purposes, is, as Nozick would call it, the end-of-pipe *pattern* of distribution.

Last but not least, though most people think it important to distinguish between liberal and material dividends from the outset, so that an egalitarian maximization of the former can be lexically ordered ahead of the latter - in this respect Rawls speaks for the vast majority of contemporary political thinkers - the contractarian does not. He understands that liberal and material dividends are of a piece, not only because, as Jan Narveson points out, the right to an object is just shorthand for the right not to be interfered with in one's doing only certain things with it, but because, as the history of post-War southern Africa clearly demonstrates, we often do, and should, as gladly trade certain liberties for certain material dividends as we do and should trade material dividends for liberties. That, in their desperately trying to get into Apartheid South Africa, the blacks of Mozambique were clearly rejecting Rawls' lexical ordering of equal liberty can only suggest, for Rawls, that they fell short of the circumstances of justice. But then what accounts for the fact that *you* and *I* reject this lexical ordering just as readily and happily?!

Now then, Robert Nozick is not a contractarian. But *if* he were, he'd no doubt object to end-of-pipe egalitarianism on the grounds that

- 1) end-of-pipe egalitarianism is a species of patterning,**
- 2) patterning involves an egregious diminution of liberty, and**
- 3) liberty is, if not *the* utile that a rational self-interest agent is concerned to maximize, then it is at least a utile of virtually trumping import.**

(Such constant redistribution is also egregiously inefficient. But insofar as Nozick isn't a contractarian, that can play only a supplementary role in his argument.) He is, of course, right about (1) and (2), but, as we've already seen, he's wrong about (3). So *his* argument against egalitarianism is unsound.

Jan Narveson, by contrast, *is* a contractarian. And though he no doubt shares many of Nozick's pre-theoretical intuitions about the intrinsic value of liberty - *as do we all!* - his argument is that since

- 4) egalitarianism is pareto-inferior to any number of alternatives,**
- 5) rational self-interested agents would *not* institute it.**

As we'll see, however, (4) is too strong. And even if (4) were true, (5) doesn't follow from it. (4) is too strong because

- 6) letting others get too far ahead of us courts worsening our own bargaining position relative to these others in future encounters. And**
- 7) getting too far ahead of others renders us rationally lootable.**



Narveson is right to suggest that such looting is often short-sighted. But 'often-talk' is 'rule-of-thumb talk', rule-of-thumb talk fails to provide us with decidability, and an undecidable normative theory is not - at least as I conceive the task of normative moral and/or political theory - a normative theory worthy of the name.

And why does (5) not follow from (4) even if (4) were true? Because any predilection for pareto-superiority, as such, would have to be a moral one, and yet the contractarian model is prohibited from presupposing any such moral predilection. Or, even if acceding to pareto-superior distributive schemata might well be a rule of thumb sanctioned by an algorithm suitably reduced, once again, rule-of-thumb talk falls short of decidability. And decidability is a sine qua non of any theory worthy of the name.

## V. THE 'CIRCUMSTANCES OF JUSTICE' CHEAT

In a paper entitled "A Proof that *Libertarianism* is Either False or Banal", I pointed out that it's clearly *false* that

**in every possible world which is both anthropic and dividend-able, and in every circumstance in that world (or world), every pair of persons concerned to maximize their expected utilities, and competent to see how best to do this, would cooperate to put in place institutions designed to ensure that every person will respect the liberty of every other person.**<sup>6</sup>

And, I argued, it's only *uninterestingly* true that

**in some such world and some such situation, some such person-pair would cooperate to put in place institutions designed to ensure that some person respect the liberty of some other person.**

That said, however, I allowed that the libertarian could salvage our interest if he could show that his claims were true even in *most* situations, provided he could formalize those situations and those in which it was not. And this, I argued, he couldn't do. But even supposing he could, what would result would be a circumscription of the circumstances of justice so narrow that his claims about respecting liberty couldn't help but be true.

The same argument-form can be - and now shall be - used against those who presume to pronounce categorically on what rational self-interested maximizers would countenance respecting end-of-pipe egalitarianism. Of *course* there are circumstances under which, and person-pairs for whom, it would be wise to ensure that some people have an equal share of some dividend. Of *course* there are circumstances under which, and person-pairs for whom, it would be foolish to even *allow*, let alone tolerate, some people having an equal share of some dividend. And of *course* one can circumscribe these circumstances in such a way as to promote these existential quantifiers to universal ones. What I can't

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<sup>6</sup> In *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 34, 2000, pp. 359-367

allow, however, is that in so doing one's made much of a contribution to normative ethics and/or politics. A moral and/or politic theory worthy of the name must, I submit, scope over all and any circumstance as described in (a) through (d) above. To wit:

## VI. SOME GOOD COUNSEL

Under what conditions, and with respect to which dividends, is an egalitarian distribution of those dividends good counsel? Formally, whenever such a distribution of **d** between **a** and **b** can be expected to maximize the utility of both **p1** and **p2**. When will this be the case? Whenever the costs in utility to **p1** and **p2** of the consequences of a non-egalitarian distribution of **d** between **a** and **b** outstrip the costs of an egalitarian distribution of **d** between **a** and **b**. But, can any generalizations beyond the (rather uninformative) level of often-talk be made on this 'whenever'? Well, here's a (hopefully) representative sample of the kinds of recommendations contractarianism might be in a position to make:

Certainly any **p1** and **p2** would be ill-advised to allow anyone to whom they're significantly vulnerable to fall below his level of subsistence. So a contractarian could, and probably should, support some species of welfarism. How much *more* than subsistence he'd countenance will depend on the balance of that vulnerability, a significant part of which is the balance of military power between the haves and have-nots, and a significant part of *that* being the current state of military confederacies.

Lct's cash this out: Most civil libertarians think that equality of civil liberties has something to do with some kind of equality going into the theory. This is nonsense. Civil liberties have to do with freedom of confederacy, and freedom of confederacy is ultimately military. It's hardly ever in our interest to allow others to confederate against us. So whatever degree of equality of civil liberty we countenance must owe its etiology to the fact that we're equally diffident about being cut off from a pack.

From all of the above it might be supposed that everyone capable of such rebellion should be guaranteed life-sustaining health care. But this would be too quick. What's peculiar about life-sustaining health care is that it's almost impossible to extort. I can hold a gun on you to anaesthetize me for a life-sustaining operation. But once I'm anaesthetized, my power over you is forfeit. Furthermore, even supposing I needn't fear my surgeon, since there are many cases of life-sustaining dividends which are both indivisible and inadequate to meet demand, e.g. organs for transplants, and since open warfare over such dividends would likely render them no longer such - think of the story of Solomon and the two mothers! - we can reasonably expect people not to go to war over these organs. But, I hasten to add, if and only if they're assured of an equal *chance* at receiving these organs. Nor will it do to assure them of an equal chance at acquiring the money with which to *compete* for these organs, i.e. to sell organs to the highest bidder. For then, having 'squandered' their chance, suppose, they'd have no choice but to go to war to reacquire the money they'd squandered. In short, some measure of socialized health care does indeed seem to be a good hedge against rational looting.

## VII. INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS

These remarks have been, as I say, a mere representative sampling of how equality does or doesn't figure in a contractarian analysis of distributive justice. But, before closing, I'd like to say a few words about the

virtue of this account with respect to the (erstwhile seemingly intractable) problem of interpersonal utility comparisons.

Before one can fruitfully enquire as to what one might reasonably claim to be the *scope* of an equality claim, we need to resolve the problem of the incommensurable interpersonal utility functions. That is, it's to be noted that the egalitarian wishes to ensure that X and Y enjoy an *equal* share of something. But one can't repeat the definiendum in the definiciens. So what is it to have an 'equal' share of a liberal of material dividend? My 10 dollar bill is *no more* equal (in any sense relevant to morality and/or politics) to your two fives than  $2+2$  is equal to 4. Considerably less so, in fact. For even supposing my ten and your two fives are equal in the sense that  $2+2$  is equal to 4, what if I can trade my ten for two pizzas whereas you can only manage to buy one with your two fives? Or worse yet, what if you derive more utility from one pizza than I derive from two? And so on.

The problem of interpersonal utility comparisons is, of course, an old saw, but not, on that account, any the less irksome. Still, it might be supposed that this problem is confined to material dividends. Or at least that it's less dire with respect to liberal ones. But I think even this is overly optimistic. It's not just that freedom of expression, say, will be more valuable to someone who has something seditious to say than it will to someone more content with the status quo. It's also that a purely formal (i.e. negative rights) interpretation of this freedom will be entirely useless to those who can't articulate themselves very well. So, to be equally free to express ourselves, must we each have our own press, or just each not be prevented from submitting to the press? And must the radical have more access to the press than the conservative?

The analysis just provided, however, falls clearly on the side of those who, in their advocating equality with respect to some dividend-kind, be it material or liberal, urge a *substantive* interpretation of that equality. With respect to material dividends, that means that, where men and women are entitled to equal shares of the pizza, because his motive for seeking 1800 calories per day is equal to hers for seeking only 1200, the man may indeed be entitled to three fifths of it and the woman to only two. And with respect to liberal dividends, that means that *sometimes*, at least, the radical candidate *is* entitled to more than numerically equal time to the mainstream candidate.

Unfortunately, any further implications of this analysis I shall have to leave for a day when we're more at our leisure.